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Guest Columns
GUEST VIEW
Rethinking abortion | David K. Clark
DAVID K. CLARK
Oct 13, 2024
Missoulian Guest Column: 10/14/24
The abortion debate is unfortunately too often glossed as the “potential person’s right to life” vs the “woman’s right choose” what to do with her body. A more exacting and appropriate framing is suggested below.
Potential persons?
The naïve version of the argument from potentiality alleges that it is morally wrong to kill anything that is potentially a person. If true, then if one further assumes that gametes (sperm and egg cells), zygotes and fetuses all constitute potential persons, aborting them or causing their death through contraception is a moral outrage — murder.
This argument is driven by the following general premise. To be a potential something is to have the moral rights of that actual something. Accordingly, to be a potential person is to possess the moral rights of the actual person. Thus, since actual persons have the right to life, aborting a potential person is clearly immoral.
But something is amiss here. Consider Singer’s example where Prince William does not now hold the rights of the actual monarch merely in virtue of being the presumptive (potential) future king. Or again, the potential licensed driver does not possess the rights of the actually licensed driver. Such considerations suggest that the naïve potentiality argument is simply unsound and its guiding premise false.
Sophisticated argument from potentiality
This form of the potentiality argument urges that the only organism that can possess personhood rights is the person herself! Just as merely possible people are not actually people, merely potential rights are not actual rights. Accordingly, the non-person (the merely potential person) has no personhood rights at all. In order to possess such rights, the bearer must already be identical with an organism which is actually a person.
So at what point is an existing organism identical with an actual person who is endowed with human rights? Surely not as a gamete. Neither the ununited sperm nor egg is identical to any individual zygote, embryo or fetus.
Alternatively, consider an individual fetus which has a unique DNA code which, after twining can no longer occur (10-12 weeks), is biologically irreversible. This suggestion carries some promise. Yet it too fails. While biological irreversibility is likely a necessary condition for being a person, it is not sufficient. Such organisms do not even possess a brain. There is no “there” there.
Perhaps then human personhood is at one with self-consciousness? But this esteemed position also seems flawed. For since most agree that self-consciousness begins some weeks after birth, neonates would be served up as candidates for abortion.
A suggested middle ground advances a secular (theocratic declarations are not arguments) mind-brain-person identity. Here, the basic criterion for being a person throughout the individual’s development is the organism’s acquisition of a conscious brain. This is believed to occur circa mid-gestation—20-28 weeks after pregnancy. It is in virtue of the potential delivered through a healthily functioning brain that one and the same individual is identical with a person having personhood rights.
What rights are definitive of personhood?
B.A. Manninen calls such proprietary rights welfare rights. These include legal, health and education protections, along with the right to continued existence. Such rights confer singular benefits, while deprivation thereof leads to unspeakable harm. Obviously, the nascent person need not be in imminent jeopardy in order to possess such rights now.
Conclusions. 1) During pregnancy, the “mother’s right to choose” — i.e. her privacy rights — absolutely prevail until the fetus has become a person (post twenty weeks of gestation). 2) Thereafter, the mother’s bodily decisions must be balanced against newly acquired personal welfare rights of the human fetus.
David K. Clark has a Ph.D. in philosophy from Purdue University and taught philosophy and liberal studies at UM from 1996 to 2015. He has published numerous books and articles.
David K. Clark: Re-thinking the Abortion Enigma
The abortion debate is unfortunately too often glossed as the “potential person’s right to life” vs the “woman’s right choose” what to do with her body. A more exacting and appropriate framing is suggested below.
Potential Persons?
The naïve version of the argument from potentiality alleges that it is morally wrong to kill anything that is potentially a person. If true, then if one further assumes that gametes (sperm and egg cells), zygotes and fetuses all constitute potential persons, aborting them or causing their death through contraception is a moral outrage—murder.
This argument is driven by the following general premise. To be a potential something is to have the moral rights of that actual something. Accordingly, to be a potential person is to possess the moral rights of the actual person. Thus, since actual persons have the right to life, aborting a potential person is clearly immoral.
But something is amiss here. Consider Singer’s example where Prince William does not now hold the rights of the actual monarch merely in virtue of being the presumptive (potential) future king. Or again, the potential licensed driver does not possess the rights of the actually licensed driver. Such considerations suggest that the naïve potentiality argument is simply unsound and its guiding premise false.
Sophisticated Argument from Potentiality
This form of the potentiality argument urges that the only organism that can possess personhood rights is the person herself! Just as merely possible people are not actually people, merely potential rights are not actual rights. Accordingly, the non-person (the merely potential person) has no personhood rights at all. In order to possess such rights, the bearer must already be identical with an organism which is actually a person.
So at what point is an existing organism identical with an actual person who is endowed with human rights? Surely not as a gamete. Neither the ununited sperm nor egg is identical to any individual zygote, embryo or fetus.
Alternatively, consider an individual fetus which has a unique DNA code which, after twining can no longer occur (10-12 weeks), is biologically irreversible. This suggestion carries some promise. Yet it too fails. While biological irreversibility is likely a necessary condition for being a person, it is not sufficient. Such organisms do not even possess a brain. There is no “there” there.
Perhaps then human personhood is at one with self-consciousness? But this esteemed position also seems flawed. For since most agree that self-consciousness begins some weeks after birth, neonates would be served up as candidates for abortion.
A suggested middle ground advances a secular (theocratic declarations are not arguments) mind-brain-person identity. Here, the basic criterion for being a person throughout the individual’s development is the organism’s acquisition of a conscious brain. This is believed to occur circa mid-gestation—20-28 weeks after pregnancy. It is in virtue of the potential delivered through a healthily functioning brain that one and the same individual is identical with a person having personhood rights.
What rights are definitive of personhood?
B.A. Manninen calls such proprietary rights welfare rights. These include legal, health and education protections, along with the right to continued existence. Such rights confer singular benefits, while deprivation thereof leads to unspeakable harm. Obviously, the nascent person need not be in imminent jeopardy in order to possess such rights now.
Conclusions. 1) During pregnancy, the “mother’s right to choose”—i.e. her privacy rights—absolutely prevail until the fetus has become a person (post twenty weeks of gestation). 2) Thereafter, the mother’s bodily decisions must be balanced against newly acquired personal welfare rights of the human fetus.
David K. Clark
Philosopher
David K. Clark has a Ph.D. in philosophy from Purdue University and taught philosophy and liberal studies at UM from 1996 to 2015. He has published numerous books and articles.
Missoulian Guest Column; Feb. 3, 2024
GUEST VIEW
David K. Clark: Israel, Palestine: Something’s missing from now on?
A previous guest columnist (Missoulian, Dec. 26) would have us believe that Israel’s war on Palestine is … 1) a “defensive war,” and 2) is morally underwritten by the ancient and revered Hindu script Bhagavad Gita.
Neither claim is true.
So, is Israel’s war against Palestine a “defensive” war? The ICJ findings suggests otherwise. Consider, Hamas’ terroristic attack perpetrated some 1200 casualties and hostages. Israel’s counterattack has thus far resulted in the death of some 27,000 civilians. Much of Israel’s bombing has targeted hospitals and schools, and over half of the bombings were indiscriminate—without predesignated targets. Here, the shocking and willful infliction of suffering upon innocent civilians is beyond description. It has reduced Gaza to a state of rubble wherein scores of thousands of innocent Palestinians now suffer from famine, disease, and homelessness without any prospect of rebuilding. According to Netanyahu, this carnage will continue until Hamas is eliminated, the hostages returned, all of Palestine is de-weaponized, and the entire population de-radicalized. It is clear that Netanyahu contemplates a continuing massacre of “plausibly” genocidal proportions.
And the Gita? There the warrior Arjuna is convinced by a Godly incarnation, Krishna, that he is obliged to accept his birthplace within the warrior caste and lead his people into a “righteous” war. But this reductive approach fails to embrace the dignity and equality endemic to free self-realization.
We are also badgered to accept the false premise that a war “commanded by God” is “righteous.” Herein lies the problem. For it is exactly this sort of “Divine” mandate to which each party—Palestinian and Israeli—cling for ultimate justification of their respective claims to the same land. From God: to the Israelis through Isaac; or to the Muslims/Palestinians through Ishmael. Biblically (Deuteronomy, Joshua), YHWH commands the “Children of Israel” to cross the River Jordan from the east and exterminate the men while reaping the women, children and livestock as “booty”—thereby laying claim to Canaan (Palestine) in perpetuity. The Palestinian tradition, which also claims this same land as their God-given own, sharply conflicts with the Biblical account. This religious standoff is fruitless, has stoked a deep mutual hatred, is without resolution, and remains the catalyst for endless suffering.
What then of Israel’s “right” to become a state? But how, where, and at whose expense?! This “right,” which abuses can forfeit, has no more license than did confederate states’ “rights” to enslave their inhabitants.
What would a resolution of this middle-east conflict look like? The Holocaust aside, it is clearly Israel who has long had its foot on the neck of its neighbor, Palestine. So how about a contrite apology for the continued encroachment—against international law—into Palestinian territory? This, followed by the removal of walls, the extraction of military presence, withdrawal of Israeli settlements and freedom for the Palestinians to travel, work and determine their own destinies.
Yes, there is danger here and good-faith negotiations must be carefully secured in advance. In particular, it would require that both sides muster the collective resolve to move past what is said to be “written” by the Gods of the ancient texts. Instead, all relevant parties must learn to set aside the past while treating others with the respect all humans deserve.
Could this actually happen? The realization of such a vision would require heroes of great wisdom and courage all around. Or are we disinterested in such heroism? Not worth working for? Must we instead honor the religious biases which separate us? If the latter, then we face the doomsday conclusion that only a God can save us! Whence, something’s “…missing from now on.” (“Lately,” Lera Lynn)
David K. Clark has a Ph.D. in philosophy from Purdue University and taught philosophy and liberal studies at UM from 1996 to 2015 and published numerous books and articles.
The Moral Argument Against Fiscal Conservatism
Missoulian Guest Column; Dec. 5, 2023
By David K. Clark
Imagine yourself with more water than you know what to do with in an apparently otherwise empty desert. Yet there you encounter an individual who is dying of thirst. Do you offer up some of your own resources (here, water), or do you allow such a person to suffer and eventually die? The rhetorical answer to this rhetorical question positions us to formulate the following argument.
- If we can eliminate or significantly reduce the suffering of another, and can do so absent any mitigation of the quality of our own lives (yes, you can get creative here), we are morally obligated to provide it.
- There is significant suffering, in our own neighborhoods, cities, states, country and world.
- There are some—let us call them the ultra rich—who are often in a position to significantly eliminate or reduce the suffering of others; and they can do so without infringing on their own well-being in any way.
Therefore,
- Such ultra-rich persons are under a moral obligation to reduce or eliminate the death or suffering of various others.
Does the above argument apply only to the ultra-rich? Reflection quickly suggests otherwise. Although the boundaries are increasingly difficult to define, it is yet clear that many among us are obligated under precisely the same moral mandate. Thus we are challenged to rethink obtaining our third home, car or boat. We may well scrutinize the need for the next luxurious vacation or even our second latte of the day.
What is the best way to make this mandate a reality—bring it to fruition? Giving to appropriate and tested charities is clearly one choice, but it is not always the best one. For among other matters it is sullied by the realization that they stem too often from self-interest—tax write offs. It is furthermore tainted by the notion that such contributions are precisely as designated: they are acts of charity. Although such deeds are both good and desirable, they are supererogatory—i.e., beyond the call of duty. But the above argument establishes a moral imperative—a genuine obligation to reduce suffering whenever we can do so without compromising the quality of our own lives.
Since it is moreover clear that this moral imperative applies to us all, many will struggle about how to draw the lines. But one line is very clear. As citizens of an affluent country—indeed, the richest in the world—we are morally obligated to tax the ultra-rich and utilize such monies to create a society which can successfully address the needs of the poor and suffering (shelter, jobs, training programs, etc.). Since this is a moral mandate, then morally, we cannot be fiscal conservatives. Rather, we must aggressively promote and underwrite the progressive agenda which best targets this outcome.
There will be those who disagree, but it is difficult to find a winning counter-argument. The most popular dissent will be something like: “This is socialism; this money is mine; I earned it; the government has no right to it and is robbing us. But this reply has no merit. We are citizens of a country founded upon a commitment to become the best it can be. And while the learning curve has sometimes been steep, today’s citizens remain under that very same mandate. It is easy to misstep here and characterize America as being a nation of laws. But the more basic directive is that we learn to live well and prosper as a nation. Accordingly, we must shape our laws and institutions to minimize suffering wherever we find it by taxing those who will never miss it.
A second reply to the “It is mine” objection is that it is simply selfish. But selfishness is immoral and thus so is the objection.
Thus it is difficult to fathom a compelling counter-argument to the charge that we dedicate ourselves to the proposition of taxing the ultra-rich (and where appropriate, others) so as to realize the vision of a liberal democracy which embraces its basic moral commission.
Democratic Welfare and Liberal Arts Education
(Missoulian, Feb. 10, 2019)
As a general election looms, candidates insist we must reclaim the values central to our democracy. This is a serious misunderstanding, for there are no values unique to a democracy other than the defining mandate that any adult citizen is assured an equal vote as to which principles should guide our national and individual welfare. Here, the majority wins. And that’s the problem.
It was Plato who first grasped this crippling flaw of democracy. Consider: it would be a fool’s mission were we to undertake a national majority polling as we seek training in order to become an engineer, pianist or mason. Rather, we want, we need, guidance from experts, not an ignorant majority. Plato saw clearly that statesmanship was no exception. (No, being an elite brain surgeon is not a qualification for statesmanship, or vice-versa.) Only a very small minority will possess the expertise — the knowledge — required to guide another — or a nation — to excellence.
Plato’s solution was to elicit guidance from those who have dedicated their lives to the acquisition of knowledge — the deep wisdom required for statesmanship. While Plato was mistaken that such dedication guaranteed success, he was correct to insist that it was necessary. And so the fundamental crisis of democracy is traceable to an endangered species: an education spearheaded by philosophy, humanities, and the liberal arts — not the sciences.
For instance, if our leaders should aspire to enact national and foreign policies which are just, we must first know what justice is. But this question is quintessentially philosophical; it cannot even in principle be addressed by science.
Science is incapable of explaining how free will is possible within an otherwise fully mechanistic universe or of addressing the implications this issue has for moral responsibility. Can we begin to fathom the moral challenges which face the allegiance to a free-market economy? And life-skills training? It is indeed crucial that we find the appropriate intersection between our talents and our vocations. But absent a deep exposure to the arts, we will likely raise our children with an eye to sports and job preparation. Meanwhile, we will proudly but uncomprehendingly exercise our democratic right to weigh in on the most vital issues of our times.
These themes, and myriad others central to morality, comprise the very foundation of a liberal arts education. Absent this, we will be oblivious to the toil, missteps, and genius that punctuate the history of philosophical contributions to statesmanship. Rather than be nourished by the insights offered through stunning biblical literature, we will instead surrender these to encroaching theological traditions. We will not experience the disclosive power of poetry and the fine arts. Past guidance will elude us as we strive to negotiate the thorny issues of feminism, slavery, racism, health-care, gun control, climate change, etc. Blissfully oblivious to the eloquence of literature and philosophical cogency, we’ll be lost within our favorite mantras.
But unlike Sunday School, true education does not indoctrinate us; it liberates the honest inquirer by inspiring new insights, energizing and developing latent sensibilities, and providing the means by which to scrutinize and adjudicate our own assumptions and differing commitments. It opens the perilous path to the wisdom which informs true statesmanship.
Yes, the majority will occasionally get it right; but absent a lock-down justification anchored in knowledge rather than mere opinion, this emotionally charged pendulum will continue its dramatic swings from left to right.
As we strive for an informed majority competent to address issues of leadership, the most fundamental contribution the University of Montana can offer is to embrace the essential commitment of becoming a vibrant liberal arts university.
David K. Clark is an ethicist and retired University of Montana Philosophy and Humanities professor.
Trapping — I-177
(Missoulian, October 2016)
Let’s think about it, just for a moment. What exactly, if anything, would justify the purposive infliction of intense animal suffering? Frame your answer by imagining a feral animal building a shelter, or searching for food or water—you know, simply executing the elementary tasks of survival. But now its’ endeavor is abruptly disrupted as powerful steel jaws snap shut around a front leg. At first overwhelmed by sheer indescribable pain, this nightmare is soon exacerbated and overtaken by panic and terror. It is pinned, the cruel jaws unyielding against the now crushed and broken skeletal mass. Immobile, its’ life is now reduced to the horror and agony of entrapment. There is no respite: no solace, no hope, no relief. Traumatized, the torture can only be endured—until it intensifies as its’ sense of vulnerability is increasingly heightened. The minutes pass into hours, then days. The tongue, now severely swollen from dehydration accentuates both the anguish of its’ ever more belabored breathing and the thirst which by now has itself become unbearable. There are only two avenues of escape. Chew through its’ own flesh (can you imagine this?!) and perhaps bleed out; or, await its eventual ungainly death at the hands of its captor.
I ask again, what could possibly justify the infliction of such torture? Let’s summarize the primary candidates that parade as satisfactory answers. How about: the need of our children to become educated in the ways of the natural world? Really? Have we ever heard of hiking, exploration and observation? Beyond our own capacity to perpetrate matchless and unnecessary suffering, precisely what take-home wisdom about the natural world is afforded by the experience of trapping? Or, how about the need to control the proliferation of a species? Again, really? The benefits of “population control” licenses this above described carnage? Please explain this. And are we going to pretend that our goal as trappers is to enhance the natural order of the world? That’s why we don our trapping gear? You won’t actually try to sell that, will you? Or how about our “God-given right” to recreate, earn a living by marketing fine furs? Recreate? Again, really? You enjoy this? Or profiteering? We have a right to impose this nightmare upon the life of another? Why not move up to human trafficking which is much more lucrative? (I do hope this question is rhetorical?)
Finally we know that the traps themselves are notoriously victim-indiscriminate. The documented, not to mention the unreported, capture of non-targeted species is staggering. Look it up. Yes, it could be deer, moose, or even your beloved pet.
If you find it difficult to endorse or even tolerate the very idea of the suffering brought about by the practice of animal trapping, please be aware of I-177, which will largely bring an end to trapping on public lands. This in itself, regardless of any frustration you may or may not find among available political candidates this election, is reason enough to get out and vote. Please consider I-177.
David K. Clark (Ethicist, UM Philosophy Dept.)
Americans must not Confuse Nation with Devious Leaders
(Missoulian, November 5, 2006)
It was the frantic barking—almost instantly replaced by the foreboding silence—which awakened you. Your breath locked in your throat, you scramble to your feet. It is too late. Already in the bedroom, their bright flashlights are in your face. Quickly overpowered, you manage no real struggle. Summarily cuffed and hustled out of the house, you barely glimpse the horror on the face of the woman whom you will never again see. Chained to the floor of the van, your impassive captors offer no response to either your demands or your pleas. It is but a short time before military personnel have efficiently seated you on the plane destined to carry you on your last ride—to a place you’ve never seen and will never leave. There will be no lawyer, no court, and no trial. There is only judgment.
This can’t happen to you? This is America?
It is now. And this is your story—if you are even accused of being an unlawful combatant.
October 17 transformed America at its roots. On that day, our president signed the 2006 Military Commissions Act. Heavily lobbied by the President, then approved by the full congress, this Act declares that an unlawful combatant is anyone who—as determined by Presidential tribunal— “. . . purposely and materially supports hostilities against the U.S.”
Still not flinching? You should be. These tribunals are not courts, and the review processes not trials. Your tribunal will be selected by the same President who appointed an Attorney General who described the Geneva Convention torture provisions as “quaint.” It will make its decision based on the very accusations which led to your detention. According to sworn affidavits, you gave money to an organization now said to support terrorism. You disagree that this organization supports terror? Who are you kidding? And if it does, this wasn’t your purpose? Regardless, denials will not be considered; your case not further reviewed. You will be held incommunicado for the duration of the war on terror. I.e., until the day you die!
Oh. You will be interrogated. And this congressionally backed Act does immunize detainee interrogators against prosecution for the use of “aggressive” techniques—right up to the point of rape, death or organ failure. Now, think. You must have had co-conspirators. You will tell all you know about them.
Why did you think this couldn’t happen to you? Did you believe that citizenship would protect you? Sorry. Under the new Act, “extraordinary rendition” has come home. Like Maher Arar, El Masri, Haji Boudella and citizens of other foreign nations, it is now you who may be snatched at the airport, seized on your courthouse steps, or pirated from your own home. The very Act which parades as your safety net against terrorism is precisely what now deprives you of lawful due process.
Be clear. The issue here is not what we do with terrorists; it is what we do with those who are accused of being terrorists. It is whether we will we allow fear, or the lust for power, to shape us into the very monster we are fighting against. Will we turn a blind eye as our leaders work the Cheneyan “dark side” for our “protection?” Will we permit the innocent to be put at risk—fingered by an administration which may be incompetent, corrupt, misled, outraged at your “unpatriotic” dissent, or which simply doesn’t like your politics?
In fact it is cowardly—not to mention unprincipled—to eviscerate, in the name of security, those laws which protect the accused. No thank you, Mr. President. When justice is defined by expediency and involuntary human sacrifice, it is lost. And when we have yielded our own decency, we are not worthy of being saved.
So do you love America? Then you will not confuse her with leadership which has systematically deceived us, whose 800 signing disclaimers announce its pervasive disdain for the law, and which now dishonors the sanctity of individual citizens. We want America back!
A presidency which has routinely utilized fear to manipulate us has finally challenged us in a way which should curdle our blood. How we respond will define us—as individuals, and as a nation.
David K. Clark (Nov. 2006)
Writer, Ethicist, UM Philosophy Dept.